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 Animal Rights and Food: Beyond Regan, Beyond Vegan 
Josh Milburn 
 
This is a draft version of a paper appearing in The Routledge Handbook of Food Ethics, 
edited by Mary C. Rawlinson and Caleb Ward. For the final version of the article, 
please see the published volume.  
 
Ethical questions about the status of nonhuman animals (NHAs) entered mainstream 
philosophical dialogue in the latter half of the 20th century with the publication of works such 
as the edited collection Animals, Men, and Morals (1972) DQG HVSHFLDOO\ 3HWHU 6LQJHU¶V
Animal Liberation (1975). Animal rights (AR) philosophy, though there were earlier 
SURSRQHQWV JDLQHGSURPLQHQFHDIWHU WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI7RP5HJDQ¶V The Case for Animal 
Rights in 1983. This work offered a deontological alterQDWLYHWR6LQJHU¶VXWLOLWDULDQDFFRXQWRI
the moral status of NHAs, and, excluding Animal Liberation, is probably the most important 
20th century work of animal ethics. As it is through food (including meat, eggs and milk) that 
many people primarily ³LQWHUDFW´ ZLWK NHAs, animal ethics has long engaged with issues 
related to food, especially food ethics and food policy. Today, if we accept AR, it should be 
uncontroversial to say that we have a duty to adopt a vegan diet. However, it is my contention 
that this is not, or should not be, all that that an AR approach to food will say. As the 
philosophy of food becomes more developed, so must AR approaches to food. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I will indicate WKDW $5 SKLORVRSK\ KDV PRYHG ³EH\RQG
5HJDQ´ in that a prominent strand of AR theory now addresses AR-related questions from a 
recognizably political standpoint. Specifically, I argue that there has been a political turn in 
AR philosophy, and that this is a positive development. In the second part of the chapter, I 
 ZLOO VKRZ WKDW WKLV SROLWLFDO WXUQ DOORZV XV WR PRYH ³EH\RQG YHJDQ´ ZKHQ ZH WDON RI WKH
intersection of food ethics (and, more broadly, the philosophy of food) and AR. By this, I do 
not mean that AR philosophers should stop endorsing veganism²far from it. I mean that we 
can begin to conceptualize an animal rights philosophy of food. AR perspectives, especially 
AR perspectives after the political turn, can offer much more to food issues than merely a 
demand for veganism. In the third part of the chapter, I will demonstrate that a suitably subtle 
AR account may actually allow for certain non-vegan food practices to continue, but that, 
contrary to what might be expected, this should offer little consolation for those who continue 
to consume NHA-derived foodstuffs today. Political approaches to AR may offer us a way to 
conceptualize strong and genuine rights for NHAs while, in theory, allowing certain non-
vegan foods7KLVGHPRQVWUDWHVD VHFRQGZD\ WKDW$5 WKHRU\FDQJR³EH\RQGYHJDQ´DQG
one that is of paramount interest for the burgeoning field of food ethics. 
 
Beyond Regan 
 
In his 1983 The Case for Animals Rights KHUHDIWHU ³The Case´, Tom Regan advances a 
theory of rights grounded in the notion of inherent value. All subjects-of-a-life (including, 
though not limited to, mammals of a year old or more) have inherent value, this inherent 
value is equal, and this inherent value grounds rights not to be treated in certain ways. Regan 
argues that though NHA subjects-of-a-life are not moral agents, they are nonetheless moral 
patients, and there is no non-arbitrary way to ground the rights of moral agents which would 
not also ground the rights of moral patients; accordingly, the rights of moral agents and moral 
patients are equally as strong. It is important to remember that though The Case was written, 
and read, as a treatise of moral philosophy²some of its finest contributions come in the form 
of its crLWLTXHRI6LQJHU¶VPRUDOYLVLRQ²it is also a work of political philosophy. It is difficult 
 to avoid political philosophy when discussing rights or justice, and The Case is replete with 
UHIHUHQFHVWRERWK$VVXFKLWZRXOGEHXQIDLUWRGLVPLVV5HJDQDVD³PHUHO\´PRUDOWKLQNHU
and it is likely, especially within the context of the political turn in animal ethics, that Regan 
will more and more be read as a political thinker. Nonetheless, Regan was and is thought of 
as a moral thinker first, and his work is the epitome of AR philosophy in the 20th century. The 
³5HJDQ´ ZKLFK ZH PXVW PRYH EH\RQG LV WKH th century tendency to consider AR, and 
animal ethics more broadly, a solely moral LVVXHDQGQRW5HJDQ¶VZRUNLQSDUWLFXODU 
 
We must move beyond this²DQGE\³PRYLQJEH\RQG´ I mean supplementing, and neither 
ignoring nor dismissing²for at least three reasons. First, there is dissatisfaction with the 
failure of moral thinking to push change sufficiently strongly. 40 years on from Animal 
Liberation, and over 30 on from The Case, over 50 billion ³ODQGDQLPDOV´are slaughtered for 
consumption worldwide per year. This number does not include fish and other NHAs who 
live in water, and does not include those NHAs killed in pursuit of foodstuffs, such as male 
chicks from hatcheries killed within hours of birth. Further, though numbers are growing, 
vegetarians, and especially vegans, represent only a small percentage of the population. 
Second, there is recognition that there are certain problems that cannot be fixed by individual 
choice. Take, as a simple example, tax-funded subsidies given to so-FDOOHG ³SDVWRUDO
farmers.´A rise in the number of vegans would not necessarily have any particular impact on 
such subsidies, which would require political change. Indeed, if a government aims to keep 
their farmers afloat, it is conceivable that a rise in veganism could result in greater subsidies. 
Third, we must recognize that our obligations to NHAV DUH QRW ³PHUHO\´ D PRUDO matter. 
Liberals recognize the importance of tolerance and pluralism²and thus permitting people to 
live in accordance with their own moral ideas²but our obligations to NHAs, argue political 
AR theorists, are not a part of this. Just as we condemn those who eschew their obligations 
 towards children, so we must condemn those who fail to treat NHAs with the respect they 
warrant. 
 
We might disagree about which texts do or do not belong as a part of this political turn, or 
about which characteristics best differentiate those thinkers in the turn from those who are 
not. One way of thinking about the turn is simply that it consists in a shift of focus; while 
animal ethics has always been political, the turn is characterized by a move away from 
questions about individual behavior and moral status, and towards questions about the 
inclusion of NHAs in political structures and top-down changes²legal, institutional, 
educational, and so on (cf. Milligan 2015; Wissenburg and Schlosberg 2014). The majority of 
work on political theory and NHAs, as is typical with contemporary political theory, has 
WDNHQSODFHZLWKLQDOLEHUDOSDUDGLJPZKHWKHUWKLVLVUHODWLYHO\³SXUH´OLEHUDOLVP (Cochrane 
2012; Garner 2013), group-differentiated, relational liberalism (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2013; Valentini 2014), perfectionist liberalism (Nussbaum 2006), cosmopolitan liberalism 
(Cochrane 2013; Cooke 2014) or even, though these discussions are more skeptical, 
contractarian/contractualist liberalism (Rowlands 2009; Smith 2012; cf. Garner 2012a; 
Garner 2012b). Though this chapter takes a more-or-less liberal perspective, it is worth 
noting that liberal approaches do not have a complete monopoly over the literature (cf. 
Cochrane 2010). For example, there have also been anarcho-Marxist analyses of the use of 
NHAs (Torres 2007) and the progressive use of right libertarian concepts for thinking about 
animal ethics (Ebert and Machan 2012; Milburn 2014). 
 
Ultimately, though the political turn has probably only been occurring for around a decade, 
there are an array of approaches utilized, and a multitude of debates between authors within 
it. In this sense, the political turn should not be viewed as a unified tradition. Instead, the 
 political turn should be viewed by animal ethicists as a particular way of doing animal ethics, 
alongside, for example, legal approaches, moral approaches and theological approaches, but 
one that is sorely needed. Equally, it should be viewed by political theorists as a particular 
way of doing political theory, alongside the likes of feminist political theory. Though these 
approaches to political theory start with a particular issue, it would be to do thinkers within 
them a disservice to claim that such thought ends with claims about said issue. So it must be 
with AR and food; while AR approaches to food will begin with the relatively simple claim 
that we must adopt veganism, they cannot simply stop there. 
 
Beyond Vegan 
 
Having indicated that a political turn in animal ethics has taken place, I will now outline three 
ways in which an AR approach to food and food policy, especially a political AR approach to 
food, muVWPRYH³EH\RQGYHJDQ´ By this, I mean three ways in which merely stating that 
veganism is a moral imperative or demand of justice does not reflect all that AR approaches 
to food can, and must, say. First, the political face of AR is particularly well situated to talk 
about the inclusion of NHAs within systems of distribution. This is something that has been 
marginalized in traditional AR philosophy. Second, we have to ask about the extent to which 
our food-related practices indirectly impact upon NHAs; though this debate has been had 
within traditional animal ethics, a move to political theory gives us tools to demand the kinds 
of changes that this line of thought may entail. Third, we must ask what AR approaches 
might say about, or could offer to, existing discussions in the normative food literature. It is 
in this final question that an AR philosophy of food is most sharply distinguished from 
merely AR philosophy about food. 
 
 7KH ILUVW ZD\ ZH FDQ PRYH ³EH\RQG YHJDQ´ LV WR WKLQN DERXW the distribution of food to 
NHAs. If NHAs are to be recognized as co-citizens, or at least as members of a political 
community, then it is natural that they be included in questions about the distribution of food. 
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka develop an account of political rights for NHAs by 
conceptualizing NHAs variously as citizens of a mixed human/NHA community, denizens of 
a mixed community, or sovereign over their own communities. The authors claim 
XQDPELJXRXVO\ WKDW ³>U@HFRJQL]LQJ domesticated animals as members of the community 
includes accepting their equal right to communal resources and the social bases of well-
EHLQJ´ 142), which would include food distribution. It would be difficult to challenge 
this conclusion on the grounds that NHA members of a mixed community have less interest 
in access to distributive institutions than humans, as it is far from obvious that they do. Given 
the relative vulnerability of NHAs to the whims of their guardians, we might draw a parallel 
with children; while guardians have primary responsibility for ensuring the appropriate 
feeding of a given individual, the state has the responsibility to ensure that the guardian is 
satisfactorily carrying out their duty, and to provide an alternative should the guardian fail. 
One need not accept the somewhat statist paradigm in which Donaldson and Kymlicka 
operate to recognize these kinds of obligations. Alasdair Cochrane, who takes a more 
cosmopolitan approach, accuses the pair of unjustifiably privileginJWKHULJKWVRI³GRPHVWLF´ 
NHAs (2013), and a number of authors already stress the duty humans have to assist free-
living NHAs in need (e.g., Hadley 2006; Horta 2013). In certain environments or on certain 
occasions, it may be that the most valuable assistance that humans can offer free-living 
NHAs is the provision of food, similar to how it is already recognized by a wide variety of 
normative thinkers that we have an obligation to help starving humans, even if they live on 
the other side of the world. Of course, it may be that a particular AR approach does not 
support the provision of food aid to some or all NHAs. The laissez faire intuition²the idea 
 that we have a duty not to (or at least no duty to) intervene in nature²may continue to be 
defended by political AR thinkers (cf. Palmer 2010). Alternatively, a focus upon non-ideal 
theory might stress that the priority should be in ensurinJ WKDW1+$V¶QHJDWLYH UDWKHU WKDQ 
positive, rights be respected. The point is not so much that an AR approach to food 
necessarily endorses the provision of food aid to NHAs, but that this is the kind of question 
that should be given thought. 
 
7KHVHFRQGZD\ZHFDQPRYH³EH\RQGYHJDQ´ LV WR WKLQNDERXW WKH indirect effects of our 
food practices on NHAs. If all humans were to adopt vegan diets tomorrow, this would 
hugely limit, though not eliminate, NHA suffering caused by our food-related practices. In 
order to eliminate this suffering, we would also have to ask about the indirect impact of the 
practices. While vegan diets are certainly far less environmentally damaging than typical 
high- or even low-meat diets, a debate about NHA deaths in the harvesting process has arisen 
in the academic and popular literature (cf. Davis 2003; Lamey 2007). While this is by no 
means a vindication of current meat-eating practices or much of a challenge to veganism, it 
does raise questions for AR thinkers wishing to examine human diets. Given our causal (and 
moral?) responsibility for these deaths, it is arguably a more pressing concern than other 
suffering of free-living NHAs. While acknowledgement of this problem is relatively easy, 
offering practical solutions is somewhat harder. It seems likely, however, that this would 
require top-down change, such as legislation on appropriate food-production methods to limit 
(or, preferably, eliminate) accidental negative impact on free-living NHAs; it is hard to 
imagine individual moral choices of consumers or farmers being able to resolve the problem, 
even if we could imagine individual moral choices leading to widespread veganism. As such, 
this is a good example of the kind of food policy issue with which AR theorists should be 
concerned above and beyond mere veganism, and, indeed, may be a food policy concern that 
 non-AR food theorists have overlooked. Furthermore, it is a good example of the kind of 
problem with which political approaches to AR are better equipped to deal than the 
traditional moral approaches to AR. 
 
7KHWKLUGZD\ZHFDQPRYH³EH\RQGYHJDQ´LVWRDVNZKDWDQ$5DSSURDFKWRIRRGFDQVD\
about non-AR issues. If there is to be an AR approach to food, we must also ask what this 
perspective can offer to, or say about, existing issues in the literature on the philosophy of 
food, even (or especially) those not obviously related to AR issues. For instance, questions 
about the metaphysics of food should not be considered independently of the AR approach, 
or, minimally, the AR approach has something to offer to these debates. David Kaplan (2012: 
3-4) offers a non-exhaustive list of seven metaphysics of food: food as nutrition; food as 
nature; food as culture; food as social good; food as spirituality; food as desideratum; and 
food as aesthetic object. Each of these approaches could be seen to have advantages and 
disadvantages from the perspective of an AR approach to food. For example, a focus on food 
as a cultural practice may serve to obscure or downplay issues of justice related to food 
choices, and thus risk legitimizing (or at least failing to challenge) unjust food practices. In 
this sense, food as culture might be considered a dangerous metaphysic for AR approaches to 
food. On the other hand, framing food in cultural terms stresses that there is nothing 
necessary about current food practices²inherent to the idea of culture is difference and 
change. As AR approaches to food will challenge many existing food systems, an acceptance 
that there is nothing necessary about current practices and an acknowledgement that these 
practices can change is necessary. This example should show that AR approaches to food and 
the metaphysics of food should not be considered independently, and I hope more work in 
this area will be forthcoming. If AR it to be a philosophy of food, rather than just philosophy 
about food, these are the kinds of questions which proponents must examine. 
  
A final point to consider is that an AR approach to food must nonetheless be required to 
accommodate issues not directly related to the rights of NHAs; it cannot, to put it another 
way, exist in a vacuum. This is particularly true of the potential human consequences of 
realizing an AR vision of food production. Allow me to offer three examples. First, there are 
potential public health consequences. Certain major health problems²such as cardiovascular 
disease, obesity, high blood pressure, some cancers, and diabetes²are much less associated 
with veganism than ³QRUPDO´GLHWV, but some nutrients, including vitamin D and vitamin B12, 
can be lacking in badly-planned vegan diets (Craig 2009; Craig and Mangels 2009). The 
extent to which these kinds of deficiencies could be a problem, as well as possible solutions, 
should be explored by bioethicists and other health experts. Second, there are economic 
questions worth considering. The end of animal agriculture would result in an economic shift, 
potentially leaving large numbers of people out of work. The likelihood of and solutions to 
this issue need to be explored by political theorists and economists. Third, the environmental 
impact of adopting an AR approach to food policy could be very large. The environmental 
merits of veganism are well-known (Scarborough et al. 2014; Singer and Mason 2006: 231-
40), and include concerns about land use, water use, localized pollution and greenhouse gas 
emissions. That said, a shift from pastoral to arable farming, as well as the end of hunting and 
fishing, would have a dramatic effect on landscapes and ecosystems, and perhaps even the 
biosphere. Consideration of the extent to which this would or could be a positive (or, at least, 
unproblematic) change would be valuable. 
 
Animal Rights Without Veganism? 
 
 I have illustrated how an AR approach to food could and should extend beyond mere 
veganism, especially when one considers AR from a political perspective. However, I now 
wish to suggest that veganism, as normally understood, may not be the only option for an 
AR-respecting diet, and thus illustrate a particularly surprising way that AR philosophy can 
VWHS³EH\RQGYHJDQ´ First, however, it is worth saying that Gary Francione (2012) is right, 
given currently existing food structures, in saying that veganism must be endorsed as a moral 
baseline. AR without veganism, like human rights without the abolition of slavery, is not 
worthy of the name. Even if one favoUV VD\ &RFKUDQH¶V LQWHUest-based rights approach 
(2012) RYHU)UDQFLRQH¶VDEROLWLRQLVWDpproach (2010), one must still recognize that the real-
world practices of farming, KXQWLQJ ILVKLQJ RU ³KDUYHVWLQJ´ NHAs for flesh, eggs or milk 
involve the infliction of horrific suffering (including physical pain and mental anguish) and 
death, and so must recognize that respecting 1+$V¶ ULJKWV requires abstention²
economically, politically, socially²from support of these industries. Given the horrific 
suffering and early, gruesome deaths inflicted upon NHAs as a matter of course in the pursuit 
of NHA-derived foods, anyone who holds that sensitive NHAs have a right not to have 
suffering or death inflicted upon them (that is, anyone who endorses AR) displays a baffling 
dissonance between their professed beliefs and their actions if they do not practice and 
endorse dietary veganism. 
 
Despite this, questions may be raised about NHA-derived foods concerning certain unusual 
cases or plausible practices, and, if AR theory is going to engage with food theory, these 
issues are central. This is because if food theorists who do not endorse an AR framework are 
going to challenge veganism in AR theory, it is on these kinds of grounds that they are most 
likely to succeed. To that end, I now offer six kinds of issues that could challenge the claim 
that the abstention from all food products derived from NHAs is necessary given an AR 
 approach to food. I do not claim that this list is exhaustive, and constraints of space mean that 
the issues these questions involve can only be sketched. Nonetheless, I hope that the topic can 
be explored more fully in the coming years. 
(1) Non-sentient animals. AR theorists, to borrow a phrase from Francione (2008: 129-
47), now ³WDNHVHQWLHQFHVHULRXVO\´PHDQLQJWKDWVHQWLHQFHWKHFDSDFLW\IRUSOHDVXUH
and pain) is seen as a sufficient condition for the attribution of rights. If it is also a 
necessary condition, then it follows that any non-sentient animal (NSA) could be 
utilized for food purposes. For example, imagine we could say with certainty that 
oysters were NSAs. This would mean that we would do no wrong to an oyster in 
eating ³LW.´ AR, though, may nonetheless seek to restrict the exploitation of NSAs; 
perhaps there is some reason to endorse a moral line between animals and non-
animals²a kind of thought more commonly used against AR thinkers. Contrarily, it 
may be plausible to say that AR advocates not only may eat NSAs, but should. Chris 
Meyers (2013) argues that, given insect non-sentience and given the environmental 
impact of certain forms of arable agriculture, vegans may have an obligation to adopt 
HQWRPRSKDJ\ 7KRXJK 0H\HUV¶V SUHPLVHV DUH TXHVWLRQDEOH LQVHFW QRQ-sentience is 
not as clear-cut as he argues, and a greater defensH LV QHHGHG RI HQWRPRSKDJ\¶V
environmental merits), this kind of thought does warrant attention from AR theorists. 
AR approaches to food, then, may well be non-vegan insofar as they could permit (or 
endorse) the consumption of NSAs. 
(2) Plausibly sentient animals. Between the NSAs and obviously sentient NHAs are 
plausibly sentient animals (PSAs). The most obvious way to address this question is 
with a kind of precautionary principle: as we do not know for sure whether these 
animals are sentient, and thus whether they have rights, it is better to treat them as if 
they are, and so do. This means that we should not eat them. However, I have 
 elsewhere (forthcoming) argued that simply endorsing a principle prohibiting the 
killing of PSAs might be to oversimplify. Instead, I argued that  we might plausibly 
endorse the killing of PSAs for food if sufficiently important ends were furthered. 
Specifically, I argued that mere gustatory pleasure could not justify the killing of 
PSAs, but feeding carnivorous members of a mixed human/NHA society might. A 
similar line of argument might be applicable in other cases. Say a whole cultural 
identity revolved around flesh-eating. While an AR position could never endorse 
allowing members of that culture to continue to kill (say) cows, chickens or fish, 
perhaps it could allow that members of these cultures could continue to eat PSAs. 
This is worth exploring, and is a possible way that AR theory might accommodate 
claims about the value of particular food practices (cf. Barnhill et al. 2014; Lomasky 
2013) without compromising its central principles. 
(3) Technological solutions. One key issue at the intersection of food ethics/policy and 
AR philosophy is the possibility of technological solutions to ³DQLPDODJULFXOWXUH.´ In 
vitro flesh has been shown to be technologically (if not yet economically) viable, and 
so offers us a vision of a non-vegan food that nonetheless respects the rights of NHAs. 
Milk produced without cows (Pandya 2014), too, is on the scientific horizon. A 
number of ethical challenges to lab-grown flesh from outside of AR philosophy are 
conceivable but unconvincing (for reviews and responses, see Hopkins and Dacey 
2008; Schaefer and Savulescu 2014), but questions may be raised from within AR 
philosophy. These include, but are likely not limited to, the extent to which NHAs 
ZRXOG KDYH WR UHPDLQ D SDUW RI WKH ³IRRG LQGXVWU\´ IRU WKH KDUYHVWLQJ RI JHnetic 
material) and their treatment, as well as questions of respect. This latter point is raised 
by Donaldson and Kymlicka; perhaps producing NHA, but not human, flesh in this 
way would reaffirm false ideas about human superiority, by extending to humans a 
 respect that we do not extend to NHAs (2013: 152). Similar concerns could be raised 
about other technological sources of meat. It is conceivable that we could genetically 
engineer some NHAs to be non-sentient (Shriver 2009), but the genetic engineering of 
NHAs raises a host of other ethical problems (cf. Cochrane 2012: ch. 5), which 
require consideration by AR theorists. Though they require further scrutiny, the 
various plausible technological solutions give hope for a non-vegan AR approach to 
food policy. 
(4) Scavenging. The question of to what extent it may be ethically permissible to eat 
³VFDYHQJHG´IOHVK is a point of contention within vegan discourse. ³)reeganism,´DW
least partially, grew out of veganism, and is mostly asVRFLDWHG ZLWK ³GXPSVWHU-
GLYLQJ´ or living off food (including NHA-derived products) taken from supermarket 
bins (Singer and Mason 2006: 267-8). Even if supermarkets stopped selling NHA-
derived foodstuffs, freegans might still eat scavenged fleVK VXFK DV ³URDGNLOO´ 
Leaving aside that we have an obligation to start designing our roadways to minimize 
NHA deaths (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013: 201), it remains an open question 
whether AR philosophy might permit the scavenging of corpses. 
(5) Genuinely HWKLFDO³IDUPLQJ´ Donaldson and Kymlicka (2013: 138) sketch a picture 
of genuinely ethical egg production. Chicken citizens could be left to incubate some 
eggs, but some excess eggs could be taken for human consumption. The process could 
not be commercialized (as this would exacerbate the chance of abuse) and the abusive 
practices standard in egg production (forced starvation, chick-culling, beak-trimming, 
slaughter, etc.) would not be permitted. Though rights-respecting dairy production 
seems somewhat more difficult, Cochrane offers the idea of farming NHAs for their 
corpses, indicating that a meat industry without slaughterhouses is possible (2012: 
87); the extent to which such an industry could be consistent with AR positions is 
 worth exploration. Francione objects to these kinds of ideas in principle, as, for him, 
recognition of AR requires the rejection of all use of NHAs (Francione 2008: 1-66; 
)UDQFLRQH7KHUHKDYHEHHQDYDULHW\RIFKDOOHQJHVWR)UDQFLRQH¶VSRVLWLRQEXW
perhaps most interesting is the claim that his approach has unacceptable consequences 
concerning the treatment of the disabled. Katherine Wayne (2013), who endorses a 
FRQFHSWLRQRI$5VLPLODUWR'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFND¶V argues that the relationship 
between some disabled humans and caregivers is similar to a conceivable relationship 
between dependent NHAs and human caregivers. Wayne shows that certain modes of 
interaction between disabled humans and their guardians which are consistent with a 
IXOO UHVSHFWRI WKH IRUPHUSDUW\¶VULJKWV LQYROYH WKH³XVH´RI WKHGHSHQGHQWSDUW\E\
the caregiver. As such, unless Francione wishes to make some deeply questionable 
claims about the relationships people might have with certain disabled humans, he 
ZRXOGKDYHWRFRQFHGHWKDWWKHUHDUHVRPHZD\VLQZKLFK1+$VFDQEH³XVHG´ZKLFK
are consistent with full respect. It should be made clear, though, that these debates are 
theoretical, and do not absolve the meat, dairy and egg industries of wrongdoing. 
³+DSS\´ PHDW DQG ³IUHH UDQJH´ HJJV DUH SURGXFHG XVLQJ SURFHVVHV LQLPLFDO WR WKH
goals of AR. To repeat: even if an AR-consistent farm can be imagined in theory, 
abstention from NHA-derived foodstuffs would remain an obligation today for those 
who endorse AR. 
(6) Subsistence hunting. AR approaches to food can expect criticism due to what may be 
perceived as support for an imperialistic imposition of a particular (Western?) norm of 
justice on those who do not recognize that norm. Specifically, AR approaches demand 
that the food practices of almost all cultures, including the most oppressed cultures, 
change drastically. AR theorists should not and do not try to hide this aspect of their 
thought. Very few people hold that the most fundamental rights of humans can be 
 ignored in the name of cultural autonomy or tradition, and, equally, we should not 
hold that the most fundamental rights of NHAs can be. Cultures change and adapt, 
and part of this evolution involves the acceptance of moral truths that were 
unthinkable, unclear or neglected before. If some hypothetical culture is so connected 
to the killing of NHAs that acceptance of AR amounts to the end of the culture in a 
recognizable form, then, while this may be regrettable, one has to ask how valuable 
that culture was to start with (Cochrane 2012: 192; Horta 2013: 377). A more difficult 
question arises in the case of subsistence hunting. AR theorists generally do not say 
that engaging in subsistence hunting is wrong (e.g., Cochrane 2012: 191; Donaldson 
and Kymlicka 2013: 41; Linzey 2009: 134). Alternatively, it is conceivable that, if 
subsistence hunting is wrong, it is an excusable wrong. Similarly, it may be the case 
that AR theory is open to humans eating NHAs in the ubiquitous desert island 
scenario; this does not tell us much of interest, as we might equally be open to the 
killing and eating of humans in these cases (Charlton and Francione 2013: 50-4; 
Francione 2007: ch. 7). Importantly, though, AR approaches to food should not 
simply accept subsistence hunting as unproblematic. We can ask to what extent 
particular practices are genuinely instances of subsistence hunting²Andrew Linzey, 
for example, refutes the claim that Canadian coastal communities rely on seal hunting 
(2009: 134-6)²and ask what can be done to bring genuine subsistence hunters out of 
their current situation. 
 
The above list is indicative of how AR approaches may move beyond veganism. Here, and 
contrary to my prior use, I mean that as we explore the issues at the intersection of AR²
especially political conceptions of AR²and food theory, we see that there are ways in which 
 dietary veganism, understood simply as abstention from all NHA-derived food products, may 
theoretically be unnecessary. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Animal ethics has recently seen a political turn²a shift away from the traditional moral focus 
and towards SROLWLFDOWKHRU\,QWKLVVHQVHDQLPDOHWKLFVKDVPRYHG³EH\RQG5HJDQ´$QLPDO
rights philosophy, whether in its traditional moral or newer political form, has always had 
much to say about food, especially with regard to food ethics and food policy. However, and 
especially with the emergence of much normative work on food, it must be realized that there 
is more to AR and food than simply an endorsement of veganism, and the time is now right 
for a distinctive animal rights philosophy of food. This perspective will move beyond 
veganism in a number of ways. Importantly, it will recognize that our food-related 
obligations to NHAs extend beyond merely not eating them and it will address issues that are 
not obviously related to NHAs. Perhaps most interestingly of all, an AR approach to food 
will address the question of whether NHA-derived foods might be acquired in a just way at 
some point in the future. While further research on this issue is required, this is precisely 
what an AR approach to food will be best situated to offer. Despite this, whatever promise 
developments in AR theory hold, and even if an AR approach to food must move beyond this 
claim, the central demand remains constant. We must go vegan, and we must encourage those 
around us to do the same. To do anything less is to fail to respect the rights of nonhuman 
animals. 
 
Related Topics 
 
 Ethical consumerism and food politics; Ethics of animal agriculture; Confinement agriculture 
from a moral perspective; Animal welfare; Food, welfare and agriculture; Veganism as a 
moral imperative. 
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